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Calhoun: Turkish Confessions Law

CONFESSIONS AND THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
REFLECTIONS ON
RECENT CHANGES IN
TURKISH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ROBERT K. CALHOUN *

The author delivered these remarks at the
First International Workshop on Criminal Law Reform
which was held in Istanbul, Turkey from October 20-24, 1999.
The conference was sponsored by the Goethe Institute;
Heinrich-Eoell-Stifling, Germany;
University of Kansas School of Law;
Marmara University School of Law; and
Yeditepe University School of Law

My topic for today - the law of confessions and the right to access to
counsel - has been the subject of numerous reform efforts in Turkey
over the past several years. These reform efforts began with the 1992
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and continued through the
1997 amendments to the Code and the 1998 Regulations on Police
Interrogation approved by the Ministers of Justice and the Interior. The
proposed 1999 Draft of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code builds
upon these reform efforts, extending them, as I understand it, to all
criminal cases, including those coming before the State Security Courts.
As a result of these efforts at reform, to an outsider looking in
(particularly one from the Unites States) there is much that looks
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate Law School. A.B., Univeristy of Rochester, 1964; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1970. I am grateful to Professor Feridun Yenisey for his helpful comments. I also
wish to thank Erin Klingele, Golden Gate Law School class of 2000, for her research assistance.
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surprisingly familiar about Turkish confessions law. Moreover, when
such an observer comes - as I do - with a belief that criminal justice
systems that are founded upon a respect for personal liberty and basic
human rights are the hallmark of a free and democratic society, the
current system in Turkey is one that appears worthy of considerable
commendation.
However, there are two areas in which I would suggest that further
reform in Turkey might profitably be considered.
The first would be to extend the same rights and protections to those who
are being detained and interrogated in cases before the State Security
Courts as are enjoyed by individuals currently charged with more basic
or traditional criminal offenses. As I've already said, I believe proposals
to achieve just such reform are incorporated in the provisions of the new
draft code.
The second area is more problematic. It is one that plagues most
criminal justice systems, including my own and most of the member
states of the European Community - that is, the recurrent disparity
between what is required of the police by way of law and what happens
in actual practice in the police station in many cases .. I will propose
some suggested bases for reform here as well.
Let me start with the need to bring practices in the State Security Courts
in line with more basic Turkish criminal procedure.
Suspects charged with basic crimes in Turkey enjoy a privilege not to
incriminate themselves which translates into a right to insist that any
statements they make are freely given and not the result of torture, drugs,
stress, pressure tactics or fraud.
They enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel immediately upon
apprehension and the right to appointed counsel if they cannot afford
counsel.
In addition, they enjoy the right to certain caution requirements (what we

in the United States would call Miranda warnings) - that is, formal
advisement by the police of the suspect's right to silence, counsel and
appointed counsel.
Lastly, a suspect charged with common, individual cnmes must be
brought before a judicial magistrate within 24 hours.
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By way of contrast, a person apprehended for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the State Security Courts only enjoys the right to counsel
once he is formally arrested or made subject to a formal order of a judge
extending the time of detention beyond the four-day period that may be
authorized by the public prosecution when collective crimes are alleged.
In short, this means, as I understand it, that those accused of collective
crimes before the State Security Courts do not have a right to counsel
during the ftrst four days of their detention. Nor do they have a right to
appear before a magistrate during this period. Lastly, even when the
right to counsel does come into play (after the expiration of the four day
period), if I read the August 21, 1998 Regulation of the Ministries of
Justice and Interior correctly, the right to appointed counsel for those
who cannot afford counsel does not apply to crimes falling under the
scope of the State Security Courts.
I would like to suggest that these limitations on the procedural rights of
those charged in State Security Courts are not in keeping with the spirit
of reform that is at the heart of the rest of the Turkish Penal Code; that
they are not in keeping with most modem efforts to control excessive
conduct on the part of police; that they are not required as a legitimate
need of all states to combat terror; and that by providing a period of
incommunicado control of the suspect by the police, they increase the
possibility of torture and other like mistreatment of the accused.
There is no doubt that terrorism represents a threat to a state's very
existence and can justify measures that might not be considered in less
threatening times. It is also true, however, that there is no greater
measure of a state's commitment to the human liberties of its citizens
than its protection of those rights during times of strife and discontent.
Indeed, as the Israeli Supreme Court observed in its recent opinion
outlawing torture of terrorist suspects, the interrogation practices of the
police in a given regime are indicative of the regime's very character.
Most member states of the European Convention on Human Rights do
not permit such an extended period of incommunicado detention of
terrorist suspects as is currently permitted in Turkey - even though
many of these states have faced very grave threats of terrorism. Indeed,
even a state such as France, which permits holding a terrorist suspect for
as long as four days before bringing him before a magistrate, still allows
such a suspect the right to confer with counsel after the first twenty hours
of policy custody.
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My own country, which has recently experienced its own unpleasant
encounters with terrorism (in such well-publicized incidents as the
Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings), still adheres to a
rule that requires that a suspect be brought before a magistrate as soon as
is reasonably possible. The test of reasonableness has been variously
measured as being as short as six hours and certainly no longer than 48
hours when the issue is the legality of a warrantless arrest. Moreover,
the right to counsel adheres immediately upon accusation or the initiation
of custodial interrogation, no matter what the nature of the charge.
My mention of the approaches of other countries is not done with the
intent of suggesting that these other countries have got it right and
Turkey is wrong. Quite the contrary, I believe that Turkey has developed
quite an enlightened approach toward issues of police interrogation. I
merely wish to suggest that this approach be adopted across the full
spectrum of interrogation contexts - including cases alleging terrorism
before the State Security Courts.
I do this against the backdrop of police excesses that Turkey has
experienced in the past. Torture and other mistreatment of prisoners has
been a documented problem in the past in Turkish jails. Turkey has
taken great strides to address this problem and, indeed, the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture acknowledged in a 1997 report
that Turkey is moving in the right direction with respect to its treatment
of prisoners. Nonetheless, reports by local bar associations, human
rights organizations and public officials in Turkey indicate that even
though Turkey has made significant progress on this front, the
mistreatment of prisoners remains a problem, particularly during periods
of pre-trial interrogation.
It is with this in mind that I question the restrictions on counsel and
judicial intervention for a four-day period of incommunicado custody of
the suspect in state security cases. By creating such a substantial period
of total police control with no possibility of outside intervention, a
situation is created that can all too easily be abused by those law
enforcement figures who may be so inclined.
This is why I read the draft code of criminal procedure as another major
step in Turkey's efforts to bring progressive reform to its rules of
criminal procedure.
As I understand the draft code, it would limit the detention period for
suspects charged with collective crimes before State Security Courts to
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48 hours; would make the right to counsel effective immediately upon
detention; and would extend the right to appointed counsel to such cases.
This builds upon the reform efforts that have characterized the last 10
years of Turkish criminal procedure modification and is another
significant step in Turkey's efforts to ensure the proper treatment of
suspects in its criminal courts.
Now let me address the other issue I wish to raise - that is, the disparity
between what is required by law and what often actually occurs in the
quiet secrecy of the police station. This is a problem in Turkey, although
such disparity problems exist in most other countries as well.
In my own country, such disparity is a significant problem. Despite the

fact that the right to silence and the right to counsel are part of the
fundamental guarantees of our Constitution (in what we call "The Bill of
Rights") and despite the fact that we proudly enforce these rights with an
exclusionary rule, we are told that American police often fail to honor
these rules and then, worse, lie - even under oath - to avoid application
of the exclusionary rule. In fact, it is a frequent enough problem in the
American criminal justice system that it has spawned its own term "testilying" (which is, of course, a combination of two English words testifying and lying). In such "swearing contests" between the accused
and the police as to what happened, judges are more likely to credit the
version of the police than they are to believe the obviously self-serving
allegations of the suspect. Recently, in Great Britain a more ominous
form of this has been brought to light - that is, the actual fabrication by
police of confessions in at least a couple of notorious terrorist trials (the
Birmingham Six and the Guilford Four).
It is against this backdrop of problems in my own country that I observe
that Turkey appears to experience a very serious discrepancy between
what the law requires by way of protection of the accused and what the
police actually provide in the police station. For example, despite the
guarantees that regularly charged defendants be brought before a court
within twenty-four hours, and suspects under the jurisdiction of the state
security courts be brought before a magistrate within four days, it is
reported that this limit is frequently exceeded. According to a recent
report of the Istanbul Bar Association, this is achieved in a variety of
ways, including falsification of the time of apprehension on the
appropriate forms, obtaining extensions from prosecutors in cases where
they should not be granted, etc.
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Again, according to a report of the Istanbul Bar Association, as well as
reports by organizations such as the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture, even though Article 136 of the Turkish Code of
Criminal Procedure explicitly guarantees to all suspects the right to
confer with counsel, this right is often ignored by police. For example, a
report of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture noted that, as
recently as 1997, the head of the anti-terror department of the Istanbul
Police Department had claimed that not a single suspect in his custody
had ever sought to make use of the right. The 1998 report of the Istanbul
Bar Association indicated that even when prosecutors have issued
written orders for contact between the suspect and his attorney, this was
obstructed under such pretexts as the suspect being taken out for an
inspection of the place of the crime.
More significantly, despite the explicit guarantee in Article 135 that
suspects be informed of their rights, and the more specific requirement of
the Prime Minister's Circular of December 2, 1997 that this be done in
writing pursuant to a specific form, the 1998 report of the Istanbul Bar
Association alleges that this is often not done at all - or if done, done
long after the suspect has been taken into custody and subjected to
interrogation. This seems to derive in part from the belief among many
police that Article 136 does not apply to "preliminary discussions" but
only to the taking of a formal statement - when, in fact, Article 136
applies quite specifically from the outset of police custody (at least for
non-state security cases).
Lastly, and most problematically, despite the very significant efforts of
Turkish authorities to change this, the torture of suspects - particularly
those charged with crimes before the state security courts - remains a
problem. The Turkish public has periodically been outraged by some of
the more publicized examples of this, including the cases of Metin
Goktepe, Gulderen Baran and the fourteen teenage suspects in Manisa.
In the time remaining to me I would like to make several suggestions

regarding how Turkey might take steps to bring police behavior into line
with what is required by Turkish law. Some of the suggestions reflect
the experience of other countries; others are specific to the Turkish
situation.
First of all, I would reiterate my recommendation that Turkey pass the
proposed draft of the criminal procedure code that would end the lengthy
incommunicado interrogation of suspects before the State Security
Courts. If there is concern that police do not always do what is required
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of them, then it is difficult to justify this level of police control of the
process. Access to the courts and counsel is a basic means of ensuring
the legality of the interrogation procedure.
Second, when there are indications that police may be misinterpreting the
law (such as when the right to counsel attaches) then the appropriate
authorities should clarify the law for them in no uncertain terms and
make clear that they will be held accountable to the law.
Next, I would recommend that Turkey do what Great Britain has done that is, require that all police interrogations be videotaped. I realize this
presents a resources problem, particularly in smaller, more rural parts of
the country. I realize also that my own country has talked about doing
this for years and still does not require videotaping as a general rule.
Nonetheless, there is probably no greater deterrent to official misconduct
by the police than the knowledge that their actions are being recorded.
In addition, I would urge that Turkish prosecutors and Turkish judges
take more seriously the allegations by defendants of torture and
mistreatment in individual cases. There is a normal human reaction to
discount such allegations as self-serving and less than credible when they
come from someone accused of serious criminality. Thus, it is not
surprising to learn that the chief judge of the Ankara State Security Court
was quoted recently as saying that allegations of mistreatment are "the
standard made-up defense of State Security Court defendants."
Nonetheless, if we know that mistreatment does occur in general, then
we must resist the temptation to assume that specific allegations of it
must always be false. Turkish courts are empowered not only with the
power to punish individual officers under sections 243 and 245 of the
Turkish Penal Code but with the relatively new power of excluding
unlawfully obtained evidence pursuant to sections 135A and 254 of the
Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure. Although anecdotal evidence
suggests that courts have utilized this powerful suppression tool in minor
cases, so far its use in serious cases is less evident. Courts must be
prepared to enforce these exclusion remedies even when enforcement
leads to the failure of criminal prosecutions.

I say this knowing that reluctance to impose the exclusionary remedy can
be readily found in my own country when the consequences of its
application might be to undermine the prosecution of a serious case:
This evasion is achieved sometimes through explicit exceptions to the
rule and sometimes through questionable findings of fact and law
regarding the actual conduct of the police. In individual cases where the
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abstract ideal of fair treatment of the accused is balanced against the
specific evidentiary needs of a particular criminal prosecution, the
temptation is frequently to say "not in this case." The accumulated effect
of many such decisions can be the silent repeal· of the exclusionary
remedy. Countries such as yours and mine that have concluded the only
successful way to oversee the actions of law enforcement is through a
rule of exclusion must have the courage of their convictions. If we are
not prepared to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence in cases where its
loss will be felt, then we will never experienced the full deterrent
potential of such a rule.
As yet a further recommendation, I would urge that there be greater
respect in Turkey for the defense function in criminal cases. I know that
Turkey, like many countries in Europe, has, in recent years, modified the
inquisitorial roots of its criminal justice system to provide a more
significant role for defense counsel. Despite this (or perhaps because of
this) defense attorneys are sometimes viewed with distrust and often with
disrespect in Turkey. This discourages lawyers from practice in this area
and marginalizes the practice of criminal law. The defense of accused
criminals (and particularly accused terrorists) is not itself subversive
activity. Instead, in a system such as Turkey's, it is a vigorous sign of a
system's commitment to the rule of law.
Lastly, I would urge Turkey to reassert prosecutorial control of the
interrogation practice. In theory, Turkish law authorizes the public
prosecutor to conduct the investigation in the preparatory stage. In
reality, particularly in State Security cases, security forces control the
process. In the past, I know that judicial police have been proposed as
one way of reasserting prosecutorial control in this area. I am also aware
that such proposals have failed for a variety of reasons. Whether or not
this particular proposal is worth reconsidering, at a minimum greater
monetary resources should be accorded to the prosecutor with the
explicit purpose of reasserting greater prosecutorial inspection and
oversight of detention and interrogation facilities.
This is a pivotal time in Turkey. It is a time of profound sorrow as the
horrible aftereffects of the recent earthquake are still being measured. It
is also a time of much ferment and change. Indeed, if there is one
possible plus to be found in the terrible tragedy of this past summer, it
seems to be that it has provoked Turks to look at old problems in new
ways. Such rethinking in the area of criminal justice began, of course,
long before this summer and has, in fact, been going on for the better part
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of a decade. Hopefully this conference and, in some modest way, my
comments, will be of benefit as you continue this process of reform.
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